| (Xerex) said: | Thursday 29, October 2009, 8:21 am |
I can ly and decieve you without words, and I am sure a lot of other people can. Just by acting in certain ways.
The problem here is Kants cathecorigal approach which lacks depth.
AC
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| I disagree with the Sandel's defense of Kant's response to "the case of the murderer at the door". I believe the distinction between lying and deception is one of media. A lie is merely using words to deceive. Can one lie without using words? No. So is deceptive action then immoral? I believe the only response that is consistent with Kant would be "yes". If this is true, then any use of words to deceive is also immoral, according to Kant's own theories. This is why I believe "the case of the murderer at the door" exposes Kant's failure to conform to ordinary human reason. No response other than a lie would be moral under the hypothetical circumstances. Therefore, lying is morally justifiable given the right circumstances. There's another fallacy to Kant that I think bears scrutiny. Are there any examples of universally-held self-imposed laws? It seems to me that every law we can name has conscientious objectors, making the idea of a universal reason that leads to universally-held self-imposed law impossible. reply |
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| I guess you didnt get it, the problem with "the right circumstances" is that those conditions are only determinated by you and you alone, and that makes it wrong to do | |||||
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| The closest there may be to universal law is the UCC - Uniform Commercial Code and Maritime Law - which tends to be much more in force in every aspect of life than Common Law or the Law of the Land. This is about as close to the Matrix as you can get! Corporate/contract/business law governs everything we do. When we are born, our parents register us as new corporate assets - with a lien attached. Our birth certificates represent our assigned stock value and are actively traded on securities exchanges. The reason names appear in CAPITAL LETTERS on most identification and financial documents is because it refers to a "straw man" entity you may not even be aware of that was created for business purposes. It does NOT refer to you, but you are held responsible for this entity and all the obligations imposed upon it (unless you know the UCC well enough to separate yourself and become only an agent of that entity). Look this up! The United States is a corporation, not a country. B.H. Obama is the president of a corporation, NOT a nation. We, as a country and individuals, are "owned" by the Queen of England - and the Rothchilds family. This is NOT "moral", but IS the result of a universally imposed and apparently accepted law. |
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| SPC, I can ly and decieve you without words, and I am sure a lot of other people can. Just by acting in certain ways. The problem here is Kants cathecorigal approach which lacks depth. AC reply |
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| Deceit is possible in many ways - with and without words. Humans are not the only animals to deliberately deceive - or lie (with language). Telling the truth yet allowing someone to believe something that is not true is sometimes considering a form of "lying" - even though it's really the other person's perception that is wrong, not what was said. It is impossible to tell the "whole" truth and people often forget or confuse things and make unintentional mistakes - which often can lead to false conclusions, but deliberately "omitting" part of the known truth is usually considered a "lie" when it is intended to mislead others with the truth. | |||||
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| Who has the right to say that lying is indeed wrong. I believe it is an art form when it is used for the good, to improve the existing condition, if you will. REGARDS GENE STEINBROOK 2525 S. BAY ST. EUSTIS, FLORIDA 32726 352-357-5901 OFF 352-728-8200 HM reply |
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| How very refreshing to find a man not afraid to give name, address and even 2 telephone numbers in a post! I am highly impressed. You are quite brave. I do not know you, but am proud of you none the less. I am not so brave, nor do I know for certain that I may find my way back to this place to read any possible response; so I leave you with my email should you decide to reply. Thanks again for your surprising inclusion of contact information. gary777g@gmail.com | |||||
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| Most of the time people lie, not to improve the existing condition, but to deceive, and to deceive where deception is neither necessary nor good. And not "bearing false witness" is also one of the 10 commandments, a moral guide many people use to live by. I am certain that the practice of lying is not something that should be promoted. | |||||
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| The difficulty I have with the Kantian distinction between evasion and lying as presented here is that although evasion as opposed to outright lying does meet the standard of the categorical imperative by virtue of respecting the moral law, it seems to me that it may fail on other grounds. Isn't it possible that, through "true evasion" with the intention to mislead, fails to respect the human dignity of the person one is hoping to mislead and doesn't the categorical imperative (in at least one of its formulations) also require us to respect the autonomy of our interlocutor by not providing true, but ultimately misleading answers to his or her questions? I think this may point to a broader problem some have with Kant's moral system--are the different articulations of the categorical imperative offered by Kant truly equivalent (or at least concordant)? --Tom Dodson reply |
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| I still think that the details bear out importance here. If the categorical imperative were phrased as "Should everyone lie to a murderer who is seeking to kill a person they are hiding," we could answer "yes." Since we can commit a falsehood without realizing we have done so, lying cannot be categorically wrong. Or rather, we can not hold everyone who has deceived another responsible for that deception. In the same way, since we can never truly know intent, we cannot hold that the intent of the action is grounds to weigh responsibility. reply |
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| In our court system, before testifying, a person takes an oath to "tell the truth, THE WHOLE TRUTH, and nothing but the truth". In law, "the whole truth" means including all relevant facts without intent of evasion or deception. Now, picture yourself in a Nazi courtroom. You are being asked, after swearing this oath, if a certain person is Jewish - knowing they will be murdered if you tell the truth. If you refuse to answer it will be inferred that the person is Jewish anyway. Only if you lie (and you are the only one who knows)will they be set free. Can anyone say they would tell the truth simply based on taking the oath and knowing its meaning? I think Kant has this wrong. reply |
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| I would never be swearing such an oath in a Nazi courtroom. I would encourage you not to do that either. This reminds me that the example of the "murderer at the door" from prof. Sandel is not so hypothetical as it seems: During the second world war a lot of people were hiding Jews to protect them from the Germans. Razzias were held by German soldiers. And they came knocking at the door to ask whether the Jews were in the house, so they could be deported to camps, like Terblinka. If you want to know more about this read about Anne Frank's house in the Netherlands. AC |
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| There is an additional solution to the "the case of the murderer at the door" that involves no moral jeopardy. If you accept the duty of protecting your friend from the murderer, and accept the potential consequences, you can be completely honest with the murderer, if you do not rely on 'security through obscurity' to protect your friend. Tell the murderer your friend is present, and bar the murderer entry. By force if necessary. reply |
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| Bar entry? Even if you could, then what? You have also barred your own exit - and given a reason to kill you as well. What's your moral plan after being honest and attempting to bar entry? | |||||
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| Can one categorical imperative (to tell the truth) be overruled by another (more important) one (to save a life)? Is there a hierarchy of categorical imperatives? reply |
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| Jelle, Yes there is, see my answer to your questions at chapter 6. The constuctive-destructive-hierarchy model is both cathegorical and consequential; that is one of the beauties of this model. Kant and Mill are telling you just half of the story, that is why you run into problems with these situations. AC |
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| A lie is an act of deception. So is a magic show, or tall tales, or undercover work, and sometimes the act of negotiation. Having a standard such as Kant's to guide us should simplify the decision on how to act or when to tell the truth as a general rule, but there are times and positions that require us to think beyond that framework. For example, is truth more precious than life? Telling the truth, like most decisions boils down to values. We are moved to act by what we value and by what we value most. In the case of the big bad guy at the door, I would have to ask myself if lying or telling the truth make a difference and who would be affected. Personally, I prefer honesty as the better choice, and it makes life simpler. reply |
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| Telling the thruth here is an immoral act. This is because telling the thruth has the consequence here (consequencialism) that your friend in the house will be killed, because you help the murderer killing your friend in the house. Although lying is an act which falls into a bad cathegory according to Kant. This just should tell us that lying shouldn't be taken lightly and is most of the time not the right thing to do. Our life, or our existence is one of the most fundamental, contructive motives we have. We value this the most morally. Telling the thruth to a murderer we value much less. Therefore lying in this case is doing justice to your friend in the house (and to the murderer) and is the moral most valued act and telling the thruth here is immoral. AC reply |
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| In reality, unless you felt frightened or the murderer had you by the jogguler, one would never just reply to someone who asks a direct question with a direct answer. One would more than likely reply with another question and several questions down the road, the decision making flow of events will bring you to decide how and what the final answer, if any, would be. So, this scenario of for "a" there must be "b" is not complete. In reality, for "a" there are infinite "b's", depending on the follow up events. in a linear existence as ours, we tend to always naturally try to equate "a" with a "b", but that is not the how the law of fractal geometry and the law of the nature ever works. In reality, human thaught and reasoning is not linear, it is unexpected, random, and very much like the universe of nature and fractal geometry and depending on the situations that arise the outcomes are soooo different that not a single man can actually perdict it and/or try to identify it with absolute and definite commitment. This how Police officer's whom make a mistake during a tragic event are so difficult to prosecute. reply |
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| In my opinion, a misleading truth would be lying, but I also think a lie can be good or bad. Just like the example of "the murder at the door," it would be ok to lie for most people. But what if your friend was going to kill the murderer's family? Would the life of one person be better than many innocent people, just because he was your friend? would someone lie to the murderer even though the consequences might be worse? This is an interesting way to put it, and I hope other people can find other scenarios that we can reflect on. reply |
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| If the friend is going to kill the murderers family, I have serious doubts whether he can classify himself as my friend; I would take every effort to talk to him and try to convince him that murdering a whole family is a bad thing to do; I would even try to prevent him from doing that. I will still be lying at the door to the murderer. AC reply |
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| Off the main topic, I was thinking about two of the examples given and wondering what others thought, too. First, the lobstermonger. If we say there was a good contract formed between the parties, fine. But, what is to say that a subsequent contract that benefits both parties can't be formed - one which acts to negate the prior contract? In the customer's case, the benefit is not taking on the liability of 100 lobsters that they have no good use for anymore. Although the lobstermonger loses revenue by nullifying the original contract, they can benefit in another way - by gaining a reputation of being agreeable, or operating an empathetic business. This whole idea seems to very much be the case of what happens in (some) retail today. Walmart figured out long ago that simply taking products back, (with receipt) no questions asked, gives more customer utility (and enhancement of store image) than they lose in sales, plus they save time by not making it a lengthy fact checking process. Sure, individuals will have different experiences when returning products, but in general the corporate stance is as described. For the case of the overzealous car repairman, I was immediately reminded of (a serious point that comes from) Monty Python's Argument Sketch. If you've seen it, you will no doubt remember the line, "I could be arguing in my spare time." I think one thing that "Sam the Mobile Repairman" would do well to remember is that (at least for some people in such a predicament) I am perfectly willing to let anyone who happens by to examine my car "in their spare time," provided that the car is in no worse condition afterwards. In Sam's case, it so happens that not only is he able to look at cars in his spare time, but he also can do it in a professional capacity. The difference is that, being the owner of the car, I have some (not all, because I couldn't back out of an agreement later) say in what capacity he is looking at my car, and in lieu of an agreement, the default capacity is "in one's spare time." reply |
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| I also found the case of the repair man suspect. First, what are the odds that a mobile repair man approaches a vehicle which was working properly when they left it, but now is somehow mysteriously unable to start. Personally, I think that Dr. Sandel was at fault. Consider that once having explained the terms of his labor the repair man began poking under the steering column. How did he gain access to the column? Once he had explained himself he should have waited for approval. However, since nobody stopped him during the five minutes he spent under the column I believe he had reason to expect payment. If you doubt how long five minutes is, please sit right now for five minutes watching the clock. |
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| I'm new to this series but find it fascinating. My first thoughts... Kant makes the case that to live by duty according to a moral law we “give” ourselves, we in effect remove ourselves from the ordinary sensory world of simple cause and effect, and end up being guided by a “categorical imperative” that flows from pure reason and is therefor universal. At the beginning of this series Sandel warned of the consequences of engaging in philosophy, about the “lost innocence” of knowledge and how once known, we cannot “un-know” something. My question... in a state of innocence, that is uninfluenced by culture, would a human child self generate this “categorical imperative” that Kant finds so valuable and sacred and beyond cause and effect? What is the likelihood of a child even self generating language much less the “higher” ideas of philosophy? If you're with me on the unlikelihood to near impossibility of a human primate generating these philosophical notions, than doesn't it follow that education, and more specifically education in philosophy is part of the causal matrix that leads a human to “self choose” the duty of the categorical imperative, and therefore demonstrate how even this seemingly “higher” “universal” truth is the result of a complex cause and effect series and we aren't as free of the ordinary cause and effect world as Kant claims we can be? reply |
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| Re: Kant's notions of freedom. “in that case every act would be governed by the desire for some object of the senses, and we could not be free” Why is a desire for an idea, or an ideal different? Why are the thirst for justice or a hunger for truth distinct, particularly if we acquired them thru acculturation and training... one might even say indoctrination? We are still expressing, out picturing a culmination of a long lineage of causes and effects even if some of them are in the realm of ideas or “memes”... why does that make us more free than choosing to do X to acquire food or water or safety? “the idea of freedom makes me a member of the intelligible world.” Is Kant's notion of freedom based on choosing the idea of the free will, potentially an act of self deception to escape facing the complexities of being a species of primate totally embedded in a causal world attempting to make sense of it and our place in it? reply |
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| Re: Is and Ought... Is and ought – what is discovered in the world of science can't decide moral questions, according to Kant. The realm of what “is” does not dictate what “ought” to be. The "is" realm of science is "at a distance" removed from the moral world of "ought." Is this true? If we are a species of social primates given to co-creating a shared culture and therefore given to generating preferences and visions and missions... ie. “To create a world of safety and sustainable fulfillment for ourselves and all of those who share the planet with us.” [just as an off the cuff mission statement.] Than within those group generated guidelines it becomes possible to see if the “is” that we observe and measure will lead to the “ought” that we have envisioned for ourselves. Yes? Concrete example might be scientists measuring the “is” of global warming and recommending the “ought” of things we might do to avoid catastrophe. reply |
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| Re:Murderer at the door: “Lying is wrong” - is it categorical? If Kant says it is still wrong to lie in such a framework, for fear of dismantling his sacred moral framework, than he demonstrates clearly how becoming so enmeshed in a world of ideas can blind us to the everyday truths of our sensory world. Kant would sacrifice the life of his friend in order to save a sacred idea... an IDEA... a wisp of a thought... a collection of neurons firing!!! He would trade the flesh and blood heart beating life of a friend he presumably loves and respects, a friend with family and obligations, and dreams and visions of their own. He would sacrifice for his sacred notion of morality? Instead he would opt for a “misleading truth.” Since, a misleading truth "pays homage" to moral imperative... and so is better than the outright lie?? Shift for a moment to the perspective of the friend hiding in the closet... as the potential "murderee", are you very concerned with “high falootin' notions” of paying homage to grand ideas or would you want us to use any assortment of words necessary to get the murderer to go look somewhere else for you? Speaking for Kant, Sandel says.... “Yes, I hope the murderer will be mislead by my misleading truth... I can't control that...but I can pursue my preferred consequences in a way consistent with and with respect for the moral law.” Hmmmm.... let's tweak the situation again. Now let's make it our Mother who is hiding and about to be murdered. Is commitment to our respect for the moral law greater than our desire that our own Mother not be murdered? If the chances of success are greater for the “outright lie” of, say “I'm pretty sure I saw who you're looking for and she was running off in that direction.” than the “misleading truth” of “no I really don't know exactly where she is at this moment in time.” [exaggeration of misleading truth by poetic license] which tactic would you employ to stop the murderer from killing your mother? reply |
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| I would say I just lie in case of the friend and in case of the mother. I am aware that lying is in most cases not the preferred action, but here it is the moral thing to do. Misleading truth leads to hypocrisy (this is ilustrated with the Clinton example). The problem here with the example of the misleading truth is that you take the chances that your friend will be killed. You choose to not control the situation on behalf of your moral conviction, and you have every opertunity to control the situation. Very dangerous (to be your friend). Though, also bigotry can sometimes be the moral thing to do depending on the situation and consequences. AC |
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| That house painting consent deal? I guess I understand why Hume was made to pay the painter... but wasn't his real quarrel with the sublet-ee who arranged to have work done on property he didn't own?... or perhaps with his friend for subletting to such an individual? It was after all the tenant who gave consent to a contract he didn't have the authority to enter into. And he is enjoying the benefit of living in a painted house. Being new to this series (though I have watched them all) and obviously "late to the party" of these discussion forums, it feels awkward to me to make so many posts in a row. If I've breached any forum etiquette please forgive me. I lack much formal education and make a living with my hands, making musical instruments. The opportunity to discuss these kinds of ideas are rare for me, and yet I'm naturally drawn to them. Many thanks to Dr. Sandel and to Harvard for making these programs and this process possible. I look forward to session 8. David www.davidbeede.com reply |
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| To reply to your question, djbeede, I think you might be overdoing it when you add over 2 feet of comments to the post even before the episode has publicly aired. Stretch it out over time and over others' posts, and perhaps respond to what more people have to say. My suggestion, anyway. | |||||
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| David, Lacking formal education doesn't have to stand in the way of thinking about morals. I respect you very much for having interest in moral thinking. Don't worry to much about lack of education, morals is in the first place about just being a human being. I wish more people, also with not so much formal education, would do the same thing as you. It is the job of mr. Sandel to make moral thinking interesting and for more people to understand, and he is doing a hell of a job. AC |
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| who is michael? I saw part of the show on PBS this morning. Is this a part of lectures that are being taught> reply |
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| Xerex, Jelle, Keddaw and Mannacio: I'd like to invite you to a private discussion group on postmodernism (Foucault, Lyotard, etc). You can't access it at present, except by invitation. You may look at the sample of comments (over 1400) by visiting the following site: http://blogcritics.org/politics/article/bye-bye-miss-american-pie-part2/ It is a focused discussion, so far between three participants, but I would like to enlarge on the group. We've still got a long way to go, and new and fresh minds are always welcome. In case you'd be interested to join, please email me and I will answer whatever questions you might have. Roger Nowosielski rogernowosielski@yahoo.com (email) http://takeitorleaveit.typepad.com/its_my_take/ (website) The comments thread: http://blogcritics.org/politics/article/bye-bye-miss-american-pie-part2/ reply |
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| why can't i bring up the case of hume and the house being painted without his direct consent? i've used every possible combinations of words in my search? reply |
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| Telling a "misleading truth" is not the moral equivalent of lying, in my opinion, but in this situation, who would have the presence of mind to stop and weigh all of these considerations with a moment's notice? Practically speaking, the hesitation that would be required would cause the murderer to push right past you, if not kill you also. The murderer does not deserve to be told the truth, here. He/she would be a vigilante, and acting outside of the law. For strictly theoretical purposes, however, the misleading truth is better. Does anyone else here share the idea I get that Kant seems to have been acting on behalf of some government, writing as if requested to come up with a moral justification that would convince a citizenry to submit their sense of morality to that of a higher authority, but yet still made to believe they were consenting from their own volition? His rationale seems a bit strained, and contrary to what my reason concludes. To completely exclude the welfare of individuals that would result from any of these decisions is cold and offensive. Perhaps the best system is one that would COMBINE categorical and consequentialist elements in some compassionate and compatible way. reply |
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| “Kant seems to have been acting on behalf of some government”. Your impression is quite right (I think). As an Enlightment philosopher Kant was trying to limit the power of the clergy. Priests were no moral experts. Every human being (male) had a special faculty to make sound moral decisions. This “Pure Practical Reason” replaced God as a moral authority. If this is a good authority to "submit one's sense of morality" to is a different matter, of course. | |||||
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| A very interesting thought by this unregistered user. For an example of a system that combines cathegorical and consequentialist elements in moral thinking see my answer to Jelle in the preceeding chapter. This thought also raises another question: Is Kant telling a misleading truth in his extensive writings? Was he aware of the consequences of telling people just part of the truth (and by this telling a lie, cause telling part of the truth can also considered to be telling a lie). As you can see with the described example of the murderer at the door his thinking can lead to you turning in your friend to a murderer, an utterly imoral act, especially because he is making his system imperative. Is Kant (deliberately) deceiving his readers? And furthermore, about the consequences I would like you to consider the following analogy: Who do you consider to be more immoral: a couple of rich bankers implementing an inherently corrupt monetary system with far reaching consequences (for the US that was being done at Jekyll Island in 1913) which make these bankers even much more rich and in fact in control of even the government, or the people who just make use of this system? The consequences of Kants thinking seem to be potentially of the same proportions especially, because of the imperative nature of both systems. Or was Kant just being ignorant? And is even the act of being ignorant in this case to be considered immoral or even offendable? On behalf of Kant I would say that I find this hard to believe, but who am I to say? AC reply |
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| Xerex, Just read your comment in #6, explicating, I presume your, theory of the hierarchy of acts and the usage of "constructive" and "destructive" as better suited evaluative terms. Very interesting and ingenious, I must say - I haven't really heard such an account before, so naturally I presume it is your own (can you provide some references?) Some food for thought. Essentially, my view of morality (and of ethics) is that has to do, mainly, with our relations to others (our own species, animals, the environment, etc), which doesn't preclude of course one's relation/ship to oneself. In fact, one of the definitions that had stuck with me was one whereby a moral man was described as having "a love affair with themselves" - courtesy of my Wittgenstein teacher - so I'm definitely not about to dispute that except for saying that the main point of focus, it seems to me, has got to do with one's relation/s to others. (Aristotle might disagree.) What I find somewhat troubling about your account - though I haven't given it yet much thought – is the idea of perpetuating the race, procreating, and notions of that sort. It’s not exactly that the notion/s of morality should run counter to those objectives, but you seem to conceive of those of objectives as constituting the basis of morality. It’s one thing to say, I suppose, that morality probably evolved out of human relations that were at bottom functional in essence, but that’s making a point as to its derivation – which is to say, a genealogical account. But to claim that responsibility to ourselves as a species constitutes the basis of morality is perhaps another. I am not disputing your notions – you may as well have something very strong and interesting going on in there. As I said, I haven’t given your view sufficient thought and I may eventually agree. So I present this comment as food for thought and as an incentive to further discussion. Roger Nowosielski PS: BTW, I answered your email and thank you for considering joining our discussion group on postmodernism. I'm looking forward to fruitful future exchanges. reply |
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| My concerns, Xerex, aren't over overpopulation. They have rather to do with the fact of morality as being "self-serving," if you carry your analysis to its logical conclusion. For regardless of your or mine views of how morality had come about, I'd like to think of it as something "transcendent," which is to say, something which has evolved beyond the original conception or intent - instrumental and beneficial as it may have originally been. A case in point: Socrates taking the hemlock rather than escaping his captives, which he could do. Also, some of the Star Trek episodes hint at the possibility that "pure" self-preservation may not always be the highest and the most noble of motives. For if the species is "flawed," the idea of "self-sacrifice" may just be "the right thing to do." Roger reply |
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| Roger, It is not self-serving which is the logical conclusion, it is harmony. Existence, procreation, being healthy are just the most constructive motives we have to ourselves, they give a fundament to our existence, but harmony remains the main objective imho. If you think your species is flawed badly, I agree with you that the best or most noble thing to do is to self-sacrifice. I dont have any reasons thusfar to conclude that our species is flawed that much. (it needs some major twinking, though :)) AC |
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| Roger, Thanks for your reply. Some answers to your questions: I can not give you any references, because this is a completely new theory. That is why you haven't heared of it before. What I can say is that this constructive-destructive-hierarchy model is part if a bigger theory called "the enclave theory". In this "enclave theory" humans/humanity are/is seen as an enclave in theirs/its surroundings. For humanity this is nature. And the theory is much about how to achieve harmony with this nature (true sustainability). But also about how human individuals and organisations of humans are related with their surroundings and themselves. Here also the point of view is to achieve harmony. This new point of view/theory has a lot of implications as for example the above mentioned model. Unfortunately, I can't elaborate on this any further in the context of this forum; it is just to comprehensive. (maybe you will read about it through other media in the future) About what you said about your view of morality: I dont think we differ that much, only I make it a bit more explicit. About procreating as a fundamental motive in the constructive-destructive model I can say the following: I dont know whether you have any children; but if you ask people with children which is the most precious in this world for them, it is their children, even more than themselves. For animals: approach a mama bear with cubs too close and you are in for a treat (she will defend her cubs with her life, even against bigger male bears)) This has vast moral implications. Though, I share your concern about human overpopulation. Don't be afraid of challenging everything I say, I do that. I am just as an imperfect human being like we all are. AC reply |
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| Xerex, I may have inadvertently erased you last comment - this format, unfortunately, seems to allow for deletions. It shouldn't be, but in any case, can you repost it. I'll check with the Wiki in case we can have a proper forum for the exchange. Roger reply |
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| BTW, the idea of harmony seems very much on the right track - Aristotelean if I may say, recalling to mind the idea of arete. Roger reply |
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| I agree with your last point, We're not that much flawed. Still, the conceptual flaw remains. Morality has got to be more than what benefits the species. It has got to aim at universal consciousness. reply |
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| Roger, Why has morality got to be more than what benefits the species? Why does it have to aim at universal consciousness? From where come these imperatives? What do you mean by universal consciousness? About the last concept: "People understand that the Ocean contains many drops. Less understood is the concept that a single drop contains the Ocean" But this forum is not about my theories, this chapter is about Kant Rawls and Hume. In case you find my theories interesting and promising we should continue our conversation elsewhere. AC reply |
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| Hello, everybody!! What about John Rawls? I really like his idea about an "original position", where people theoretically would decide, behind a "veil of ignorance", what the rules of society should be. They would set the principles and make the rules without any knowledge (any consideration) of their own physical characteristics, family position, place in society, etc. This really strikes me as being FAIR, a concept that should be eminently important in any society, but which does not seem to be spoken of much in our culture outside of the judicial system. Does anyone think the results of such a negotiation would not be fair/good? reply |
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| Xerex, Regarding your last comment, I tend to agree with the remark of the "unregistered" immediately above: I think it has got to have something to do with universal consciousness, as he or she had put it; it pretty much captures what I had in mind. (Like the idea of the ocean and the drop, though.) One reason: it presupposes the belief that the species is not flawed and therefore capable of grander things. I think this presupposition is a necessary one if morality is rid itself of all suspicion of "being self-serving," instrumental, or merely functional. In the absence of some such presupposition, it's like a deck of cards or a house built on sand. Harmony is important, indeed, perhaps a critical objective, but in and of itself it is not enough. There's still a need for the foundation, and the belief in the possibility of human excellence is just what the doctor ordered. I don't think there is any problem discussing these ideas on this forum - it does relate, however indirectly, to Kant's moral philosophy. If you're uncomfortable about doing this, however, we can move on to my private discussion thread, though I'd rather have it reserved for the postmodernism debate. So let me know what you think. Roger reply |
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| @ Roger - To your phrase: “belief in the possibility of human excellence is just what the doctor ordered”, I like to add: “and this mere hope is enough”. We can always look for a “foundation”, but it will remain our foundation, i.e. the one we human beings agreed upon (and that is not what Kant had in mind). You compare morality to “a deck of cards or a house built on sand” (a building), you could also think of it as a “flying carpet” (a fabric). |
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| Roger, I think you need to know more about the mentioned "enclave theory". In there you will find the answers you seek. The constructive-destructive-hierarchy model is just a small part of it. As this is to comprehensive and complicated to discuss on a forum like this, I will contact you by email. AC reply |
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| Hold on Professor. If I want to buy a house from the owner, I could be asked to put up, let's say $1,000.00 as good faith money in an escrow account. If I decide to back out of the deal, I loose my $1,000.00 because the seller held the property for me based on my promise to purchase the house when he might have had the chance to sell it to someone else. In your example of the lobster "picker" or catcher, he might have gotten an offer from someone to pay him $2.00 each for the lobsters and he passes up that deal because he thinks he has a binding contract with the person offering $1.00 for each lobster. It is not fair to the lobster catcher or picker as you called him to loose both opportunities because the person offering the $1.00 backed out of the contract even no work has been done. As a footnote, I am sure you notice that when you put down a deposit on some exchanges, you loose your deposit if you cancel. reply |
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| The scenario of the murderer at the door may be more simple than the discussions so far suggest. Decisions are made based on duty (autonomy) or necessity (heteronomy). I necessarily lie to the murderer at my door in order to protect my friend hiding in the closet. No moral duty is required; it's a heteronomous decision. reply |
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| Well if u see ... its more difficult to tell a half truth to just speak a lie... and whatever the scenario may be a person should hold by his/her virtues and the principles of morality. This means our intent even though good should be attained through fair means. reply |
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| Good point, Jelle. I do agree that "this hope," or aspiration perhaps, is enough - which makes it a sufficient condition. I think you'd also agree that it's a necessary one as well - which is to say, we must believe in ourselves if we are to believe in morality as a kind of ultimate court of appeal. As to the foundation idea, I think you're also right that it's not a Kantian one; so we're back to Wittgenstein's "form of life" notion. What's interesting about this account is how the idea of functionality morphed into something akin to a moral/categorical imperative, not unlike, perhaps, the idea of skill as regards practice has eventually evolved into the concept of art: functionality had become replaced by aesthetic experience. reply |
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| like many i am having a real problem getting around the murderer question. i can only begin to get a glimmer of understanding if one completely takes out the emotional response and looks in pure terms. a question is asked , a statement is made, that statement could be any one of an unlimited number of truths from the moon is not made of cheese to my friend is sitting in a chair in the back room by the window. my choice is to tell a truth that is not in conflict with my other requirements-ie to maintain the safety of my friend. this by the by i see as completely different from the clinton comment which is just a lie. his lawyers defence was that clintons idea of sexual relations was not what every one else believes those words to mean but we should not be changing the accepted meaning of words just to justify an action reply |
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